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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent filed this action in the District Court
in November, 1978 seeking rec~gnition of the Mexican divorce
obtained by Respondent and Appellant in 1972 and seeking an
order declaring a 1973 Settlement Agreement as the valid
property settlement as between the parties.
p. 0003.

Record on Appeal

Appellant, by way of her Amended Answer, admitted

the Mexican divorce but alleged that the Settlement Agreement
was unfair, unconscionable, and inadequate with regard to the
provisions for child support and the division of the marital
property.

Record on Appeal, p. 0017, 0018.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A trial was held on November 28, 1979.

Judgment

was filed on January 16, 1980 awarding Appellant custody of
the parties' three minor children and child support of $100.00
per month per child.

In addition, judgment was entered in favor

of the Respondent as to the Settlement Agreement, with the
District Court holding it to be valid between the parties for
the reason that the Appellant had "abandoned any action to void
said agreement or, by her conduct, having been estopped from
asserting any claim for voidance thereof."
pp. 0049-0050.

Record on Appeal,

This later portion of the Judgment is the

subject of this appeal.
-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment below
insofar as it held her to be totally estopped from seeking an
equitable distribution of

the~marital

property any different

than that contained in the Settlement Agreement.

Appellant

further seeks a remand of this matter to the District Court for
a full hearing and equitable distribution of the marital
property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Melvin J. Abbott and LaRae Victor, now known as LaRae
Parkes, were married on August 15, 1959 in Salt Lake City.

Ther

were four children born to the marriage, of whom three are still
minors in Appellant's custody.

Record, p. 0045.

For nearly

eight of the years between 1962 and 1972 the parties lived in
Duchesne County at the dairy farm of Mr. Abbott's father.
During that time the Appellant took care of the farm household,
cooking meals and cleaning for the children, Mr. Abbott, her
brother-in-law and her father-in-law.

Record, p. 0102; Transcri:

at 36.
During the course of the marriage the parties
purchased numerous parcels
farming or pasturing
mineral rights.
Tr. at 63.

of real property, some suitable for

and some valuable for its oil, gas or

Testimony of Melvin Abbott, Record, p. 0124-012~

In 1966 Mr. Abbott purchased a half-interest in his

father's dairy farm at a cost of $1,200 each year until his
father's death.

Also purchased were the farm's livestock and
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The real estate and personal effects held at the time of the
parties' divorce, and their values, are detailed in the
Respondent's Answers to Interrogatories, Record, pp. 0027-0032.
The parties obtained a M~·xican divorce in September,
1972 which did not contain provisions as to child support or
property division.

During the year following the divorce, the

parties discussed reaching a property settlement.
0105-0106; Tr. at 39-40.

Record, pp.

Mr. Abbott retained an attorney, David

Sam, to draw up a formal agreement.

The Appellant, who was not

represented by separate counsel, met once with Mr. Abbott and Mr.
Sam but did not reach an agreement at that time.
Tr. at 47.

Record, p. 0113;

Mr. Abbott presented to Appellant a written settlement

agreement on October 10, 1973 and the parties signed it on that
date.

Record, p. 0106, 0113; Tr. at 40,47.
By the terms of this Settlement Agreement the Appellant

received custody of the parties' minor children and child support
of $50.00 per month per child.

She received as her separate

property a 1971 LTD and a 14' x 68' mobile home.

Mr. Abbott

received as his separate property:
334 shares of General Dairies, Inc. Class D stock
159 shares of Hi-Land Dairy Class A Stock
454 shares of Hi-Land Dairy Class C Stock
1965 Ford F-350, serial number 35DR673322
1963 Cadillac Deville, serial number 63Bl53075
1955 Ford Fairlane, serial number $5RT135931
Hydroswift Boat, serial number TC125J, Utah license #402
Suziki Motorcycle, serial number 16195
Cemetery lot, Block 11, Lot 7, Duchesne City cenetery
1256 Base permit from Hi-Land Dairy Corporation
Livestock:
40 cows, 20 two year olds, 10 one year olds,
40 range cattle, and 30 one year old cattle
Forest Permit for 89 head of cattle in Sowers Canyon
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In addition; Mr. Abbott received numerous parcels of realty,
the fixtures and improvements thereon, the water rights, and the
mining interests.

These properties are described in full in

the Settlement Agreement, Record at pp. 0008-0009, and in Mr.
Abbott's Answers to Interrogatories, Record at pp. 0027-0032.
At the time of this Settlement Agreement, the Appellant
had been remarried for two months.

She was about to move to

Singapore with her new husband and she signed the document only
a day or two before her departure.

Record, p. 0106; Tr. at 40.

Mr. Abbott was anxious to have the Agreement signed, and had
told the Appellant that she received more by its terms than she
would get if the parties went to court about it.

Record, pp.

0107, 0115.
In 1977 the Appellant secured an attorney to represent
her whose services were paid for through the local Assistance
Payments office.

She filed suit in the fall of that year, seekin

equitable distribution of the marital property belonging to her
and Mr. Abbott in Victor v. Abbott, No. 6320 (District Court,
Duchesne County), including modification of the 1973 Settlement
Agreement.
In August 1978 Mr. Abbott's attorney filed a motion
to strike Appellant's complaint in Civil No. 6320 for her failure
to appear at a deposition.
hereto as Exhibit A.

A copy of that motion is attached

Appellant's counsel in that action failed

to respond to that motion and her complaint was stricken and
ordered dismissed without prejudice on September 25, 1978.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A

certified copy of that order is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
In November 1978 Mr. Abbott filed the instant action
seeking recognition of the Mexican divorce and an order approving
the Settlement Agreement as the
.. valid distribution of the marital
property.

Record, pp. 0001-0009.

A trial was held on November

28, 1979, at which time the District Court heard argument as to
whether or not the doctrine of equitable estoppel would apply to
prevent the Appellant.herein from challenging the Settlement
Agreement and seeking a different distribution of the marital
property.

Record, pp. 0079, 0085-88, 0095-96, 0140.

In its

ruling dated January 2, 1980 the District Court took judicial
notice of the previously dismissed civil action and held that the
Appellant is estopped to challenge the Settlement Agreement,
having abandoned the prior action.

Record, p. 0044.

This was

incorporated into the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Record pp. 0045-0048, and into the Judgment, Record pp.
0049-50.

Appellants' objections to these findings were denied.

Record, p. 0054.
Appellant appeals from the Judgment entered in this
matter only as to the issue of the Settlement Agreement.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1.

The District Court erred in holding that the

Appellant is barred from challenging the 1973 Settlement

-5-
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Agreement because her earlier lawsuit (Victor v. Abbott, Civ.

\

No. 6320 Fourth District Court, Duchesne County) was dismissed
without prejudice on September 25, 1978, two months before the
conunencement of the instant action.
2.

There is

insuff~pient

evidence to support the

finding of the District Court that the Appellant is by her
conduct estopped from seeking a distribution of the marital
property other than that contained in the 1973 Settlement
Agreement.
3.

The District Court erred in failing to make an

independent equitable distribution of the marital property
with the 1973 Settlement Agreement as one factor to be
considered.
ARGUMENT
I.

INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF A COMPLAINT,
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
ABANDONMENT. OF A CLAIM RAISED THEREIN
SO AS TO ESTOP THE APPELLANT FROM
RAISING THE CLAIM AS A DEFENDANT IN A
SUBSEQUENT ACTION

Rule 4l{b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
(b)
Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or
to comply with these rules or any order of
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of
an action or of any claim against him.
Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherWi~specifies,a-dismissar-under this
subdivision ... operates as an adjudication on
the merits.
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U.R.C.P 4l(b)

(emphasis added).

The case law in Utah and other

jurisdictions is clear that the effect of a dismissal without
prejudice is the discontinuance of the complaint.

See, e.g.,

Power Train Inc. v. Stuver, 550 P.2d 1293, 1294 (Utah 1976);
Although numerous courts have.-pddressed the issues of estoppel
or res judicata in cases invloving prior dismissals with
prejudice, few have had to resolve the issue of the estoppel
effect of a dismissal without prejudice.
The reason for this is apparent - most courts have
recognized that the doctrine of estoppel is totally misplaced
in the context of a dismissal where there has been no deterrnination of facts or adjudication on the merits of a plaintiff's
complaint.

Wright and Miller explain the difference between

dismissals with and without prejudice in terms of their effects
on the ability of the dismissed party to raise the same claim or
litigate the same facts later.
Even though the dismissal is with prejudice,
if no facts have been adjudicated, as when
the dismissal is for want of prosecution, the
judgment, though a bar to a second suit on the
same claim, does not establish any facts to
which the doctrine of collateral estoppel can
be applied in later litigation on a different
claim.
Wright & Miller, 9 Federal Practice and Procedure 231.
On the other hand, a dismissal without prejudice carries with it
no estoppel consequences; it "creates no problem and a second suit
is not barred."

Id. at 233; Power Train, Inc. v. Stuver,

su~ra.

In the instant case, Judge Sorensen took judicial noticE

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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of the fact that Appellant had filed an action in 1977 seeking
an equitable distribution of the marital property.

He also took

notice that the previous action had been dismissed without
prejudice in September 1978 because she had failed to attend her
deposition.

In his ruling, however, Judge Sorensen turns this

fact into a finding that she had abandoned her challenge to the
Settlement Agreement and, therefore, is estopped to raise it in
the instant case.

Record, p. 0044.

In the aforementioned Ruling, and in the subsequent
Findings and Judgment of the District Court, it is apparent that
"action " forming the basis for the estoppel is the Appellant's
failure to appear at a deposition and the subsequent dismissal
of her complaint.

This leap was made by the Court without even

hearing testimony from the Appellant as to the circumstances
surrounding the dismissal of her complaint.
For purposes of this appeal, however, it is only
important that, for whatever reasons, Judge Bailif
prior suit dismissed without prejudice.

Exhibit B.

ordered her
Appellant ha

no intention of arguing about whether that order, in Civil No.
6320, should or should not have been entered.

But the holding of

the court below, if allowed to stand, results in the transforrnati
of a dismissal without prejudice into a dismissal with prejudice.
It is hard to imagine how the Appellant could be any more prejudiced than she was by the holding below that her dismissal with·
out prejudice in the other suit is now an absolute bar to her
raising a challenge to the Settlement Agreement by which her
husband received the bulk of their marital property.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
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This rcsul t is nonsensic,\l, cont r.1 i·y to the law, and
'\

patently unjust to the Appellant.

As this Court stated in

Power Train, Inc., supra:
The dismissal of an action, although
without prejudice, 9onstitutes an
abatement for the ti~e being . . . . A
dismissal not only postpones the
action as a stay might have done, it
discontinues the complaint completely,
so as an entirely new suit must be
instituted to bring the cause before
the court again.
550.P.2d at 1294, citing Fitch v. Whaples, 220 A.2d 170 (Maine
1966).

Thus, LaRae Parkes could have filed another complaint

identical to the one dismissed in Civil No. 6320, if Mr. Abbott
had not beat her to it.

However, the District Court holding

herein barred her from raising the identical claim as a
defendant she could have raised as a plaintiff.

The fact that

the court applies the labels of "abandonment" and "estoppel" to
her act of being dismissed does not change anything; the
appellant was severely prejudiced by the court's use of an order
that is supposed to be without prejudice.

This distortion of the

law and Rule 4l(b) should be reversed.
II.

THE EVIDENCE IS TOTALLY INSUFF~IENT
TO SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT
IS ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING AN EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARTIES' MARITAL
PROPERTY.

In J.P. Koch, Inc. v.

~-~·Penny

Co., Inc., 534 P.2d

903 (Utah 1975}, this Court articulated the test for the
invocation of the doctrine of estoppel as

-9-
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whether there is conduct, by act or
omission, by which one party knowingly
leads another party, reasonably acting
thereon, to take some course of action,
which will result in his detriment or
damage if the first party is permitted
to repudiate or deny his conduct or
representation.
Id. at 905, citing Kelly v. Richards, 93 P.2d 731 (Utah 1938).
See also Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695

(Utah 1976

Leaver V. Grose, No. 16477 (Utah Supreme Court, decided April 2,
1980).
The appropriateness of this doctrine to the case at bar
is questionable, at best.

Assuming, arguendo, that a divorced

spouse could be estopped from challenging a property settlement,
this record is devoid of evidence to support such a finding.
The court's Findings, Judgment and Ruling make no mention of any
action of Appellant, other than her action in having her prior
complaint dismissed without prejudice.

0049-50.

Record, pp. 0044, 0046-4.

Presumably, it is, therefore, this act which the court

found as the basis for its holding that she is estopped because
she abandoned her claim.

There is no testimony about any of her

actions between the signing date of the Settlement Agreement and
the dismissal of her suit.

There are conflicting

representation~,

of counsel as to why she was not present at her deposition, but
surely the Respondent could not claim detrimental reliance merel]
on her failure to appear at a deposition, whether justifiable or
not.
The position of the Respondent adopted by the District
Court

apparently is that Appellant is estopped to challenge the

fairness and equity of the Settlement Agreement because he relied
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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on its validity.

The court was requested

inquire intt> both

t')

the validity and the fairness of the agreement
distribution of the property.

and make a fair

That judicial scrutiny was never

entered into because of the invocation, however inappropriately,
of th~ shield of estoppel.

Appellant contends that the doctrine

of estoppel should not be cavalierly applied as a defense to
prevent a court from scrutinizing the validity or fairness of a
property settlement, in the absence of any inducive conduct by
her to the Respondent's detriment.

The record is not remotely

sufficient to support a finding that the doctrine of estoppel
should apply in this case.
The record would also not support any finding that the
related equitable doctrine of laches applies.

As this court

pointed out in Leaver, supra:
The availability of the defense of laches
is contingent upon the establishment of
two elements:
(1) the lack of diligence
on the part of plaintiff; and (2) an
injury to defendant owing to such lack
of diligence.
State of Utah Bulletin, May 1, 1980 at 56.

As argued above, the

mere "act" of Appellant in having her prior suit dismissed,
without prejudice, cannot serve as the basis for a finding of the
equitable defense.

To do so would totally rewrite existing law

which governs the effect of such a dismissal order.
The record below contains no other possible basis for
the finding except for the fact that the Settlement Agreement
was executed in 1973 and the Appellant filed her suit in 1977.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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There is no evidence in the record to demonstrate the reasons fox

\

this four-year wait or whether it was reasonable or justifiable
under the circumstances.

We could, of course, speculate as to a

possible explanation for LaRae Parkes' inaction for four years:
as a yQung mother with minor' c~ildren able to work only infrequently, Record, p. 0114, she was hardly in any positon to afford
legal action.

It was only when she was provided with an attorney

paid by the public assistance off ice that she was able to seek
a judicial division of the property.
Speculation aside, it was the Respondent's burden
to prove the elements of the defense he raised.

This was not

met in the case at bar merely by the establishment of a four year
gap between the execution of the Settlement Agreement and the
filing of Civil No. 6320.

Laches is not merely delay.

Papanikolas Bros. Ent. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assoc.; 535
P2d 1256,

(Utah 1975); Archambault v. Sprouse, 215

s.c.

336, 55

S.E. 2d 70 (1949).
In addition to delay, factors considered
by the courts in determining the existence
or nonexistence of laches are the relative
harm to defendant, in view of plaintiff's
delay . . . .
Papanikolas, supra at 1260.
The record below contains no evidence other than delay
on which the lower court could properly base a finding of the
applicability of this equitable defense.

In light of this, the

findings should be reversed to prevent manifest injustice to the

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant.

Papanikolas, supra; Barker v. Dunham, 342 P.2d 867

(Utah 1959): Corbet v. Corbet, 472 P.2d 430 (Utah 1970); Hall v.
Hall,

326 P.2d 707
III.

(Utah 1958).

APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO AN EQUITABLE
DIVISION OF THE MARITAL PROPERTY BY
THE DISTRICT COURT EVEN IF THAT
DIVISION DIFFERS FROM THE TERMS OF
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

A.
The District Court has a statutory duty to
make an equitable distribution of the parties'
marital property.
Pursuant to Utah Stat. Ann.

~30-3-5,

the District

Court had the power to make custody awards and distribute the
marital property of divorced parties.

Although requested by

Appellant to do so, the court chose not to make any independent
determination of a fair division of the parties' marital property.
As argued previously, the court declined to make that inquiry
and

instead misapplied the law as to estoppel and dismissal

without prejudice.

This choice, furthermore, allowed the

court

to avoid its statutory duty to order the reasonable and necessary
distribution of the property contemplated by U.C.A. 30-3-5.
The actual division of property is, of course, a matter
within the judge's discretion.

Absent an abuse of this discretion

the trial courts' distribution of property will not be disturbed
on appeal.

Stewart v. Stewart, 242 E 947 (Utah 1925); Pinney v.

Pinney, 245 P. 239 (Utah 1926).
The lower court in the instant case never even got to
the point of making a division of the marital property.

The
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effect of the judgment below is to rubberstamp

a~

inequitable division contained in the agreement whereby Mr.
Abbott received nearly everything, while Appellant received
almost nothing.

The courts implicit adoption of this inequitab.
discr~tion

divisibn is an abuse of

resulting in gross injustice

to LaRae Parkes.
It should be noted that the lower court did not refusE
to inquire into the child custody or support issues, despite ib
holding that the Appellant was estopped to challenge the
Settlement Agreement.

Although that agreement set support at

$50.00 per child monthly, the court awarded her double that
amount in it s judgment.
B. The District Court is not bound by
the agreement of the parties in making
its equitable division of marital property.
In carrying out its authority under U.C.A. $ 30-3-5,
the court's discretion to make a fair and equitable distributior.
of property cannot be totally defeated by a contract or agreement between the divorcing parties.

Mathie v. Mathie, 363 P.2d

779 (Utah 1961); Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977).
The same has been held with regard to parties' agreements relati
to alimony or child support.
P. 2d 944 (Utah 1953).

See Callister v. Callister, 261

The Callister explanation for this

interpretation of U.C.A. 30-3-5 is equally applicable to propert
agreements.

In the middle of an emotional period of marriage

breakdown or separation or divorce, the parties may agree to a
division which, in light of all the circumstances, may be unfair

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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l\~; the Callister court pointed out,

it is usually children

or divorced wives, like LaRae Parkes,who lose out mo:;t fr•:ciuently
in these

~greements.

In Mathie, the Court addressed the issue of whether
the Di~trict Court could make·a property division inconsistent
with a contract entered into by the parties during their
marriage.

The Court emphasized that careful scrutiny should be

given to .these agreements by the equity court before the agreement is given any effect.

363 P.2d at 784.

Such agreements

should be "analyzed on their own facts and ... enforced by the
courts only if they are fair and equitable ...

"

Id.

Finally, this Court made it clear in Pearson, supra,
that although the agreements or contracts of divorcing parties
should be respected and given weight, the trial court is not
bound .to adopt its terms as determinative.

561 P.2d at 1082.

As

this case demonstrates, such a rule would result in gross injustic,
necessitating the intervention of this Court on appeal.
Having failed to accept its duty to exercise sound
discretion in dividing the marital property, the Judgment of the
District Court should be overturned and an equitable distribution
made after full hearing upon remand.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Appellant prays that this
Honorable Court:

-15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a)

reverse the Findings and Judgment of the lower
\

court insofar as they bar Appellant from seeking an equitable
distribution of marital property;
b)

remand this case to the District Court for a
'

.

hearitig and determination of a fair and equitable distribution
of marital property between the parties;
c)

award Appellant her costs and attorney's fees in

prosecuting' this appeal; and
d)

award Appellant such other and further relief as

equity and good conscience require.

Respectfully submitted,

~k<.~

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
By: Annina M. Mitchell
352 Denver Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
Dated:

May 21, 1980,
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